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Abstract
We present toric varieties and associated toric codes and their decoding.
Toric codes are applied to construct Linear Secret Sharing Schemes
(LSSS) with strong multiplication by the Massey construction.
Asymmetric QuantumCodes are obtained from toric codes by the A.R.
Calderbank P.W. Shor and A.M. Steane construction of stabilizer codes
(CSS) from linear codes containing their dual codes.
Keywords: Toric Varieties, Toric Codes, Quantum Codes, Stabilizer Code,
Multiplicative Structure, Linear Secret Sharing Schemes (LSSS), Strong
Multiplication, Decoding.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Notation
q = pn, where p is a prime number.
Fq – the finite field with q elements of characteristic p.
F
∗
q – the invertible elements in Fq.
k = Fq – an algebraic closure of Fq.
M ≃Zr a free Z-module of rank r.
H = {0,1, . . . ,q − 2} × · · · × {0,1, . . . ,q − 2} ⊂M .
 ⊆MR =M ⊗Z R – an integral convex polytope.
X = X – the toric variety associated to the polytope .
T = TN =U0 ⊆ X – the torus.
1.2 Error–correcting codes
Codes are used in communication and storage of information.
The message is divided into blocks and extra information is appended be-
fore transmission allowing the receiver to correct a few errors.
Let Fq be the field q elements. A word of length n in the alphabet Fq is a
vector
c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ Fq
n.
The Hamming weight w(c) is the number of non-zero coordinates. The Ham-
ming distance d(c1,c2) between two words is the Hamming weight w(c1 − c2).
A linear code is a linear subspace C ⊆ Fq
n. The mimimum distance d(C)
is the minimal Hamming distance d(c1,c2) = w(c1 − c2) between two distinct
code words c1,c2 ∈ C and c1 , c2.
A linear code C can correct t errors if and only if t < d(C)/2.
Example 1.1 (Reed–Solomon kode). Let x1,x2, . . . ,xn ∈ Fq be n distinct ele-
ments and let 0 < k ≤ n.
To the word (a0,a1, . . . ,ak−1) ∈ Fq
k of length k we associate the polynomial
f (X) = a0 + a1X + · · ·+ ak−1X
k−1 ∈ Fq[X]
and upon evaluation the Reed–Solomon code word
(
f (x1), f (x2), . . . , f (xn)
)
∈ Fq
n .
The Reed–Solomon code Cn.k ⊆ Fq
n is the subspace of all Reed–Solomon code
words f (X) ∈ Fq[X] with deg f (X) < k ≤ n.
The Reed–Solomon code Cn.k ⊆ Fq
n has dimension k, minimum distance
d(Cn.k ) = n− k +1 and correct t < d(Cn.k )/2 errors.
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For a general presentation of the theory, see Justesen and Høholdt (2017).
2 Toric varieties and surfaces
The toric codes are obtained from evaluating certain rational functions in ra-
tional points on toric varieties. For the general theory of toric varieties we
refer to Cox et al. (2011), Fulton (1993) and Oda (1988).
Here we will be using toric surfaces and we recollect some of the theory
and the construction of toric codes.
2.1 Polytopes, normal fans and support functions
Let M ≃ Zr be a free Z-module of rank r over the integers Z. Let  be an
integral convex polytope in MR =M ⊗Z R, i.e. a compact convex polyhedron
such that the vertices belong toM .
Let N = HomZ(M,Z) be the dual lattice with canonical Z – bilinear pair-
ing
〈−,−〉 :M ×N →Z.
Let MR =M ⊗Z R and NR =N ⊗ZR with canonical R - bilinear pairing
〈−,−〉 :MR ×NR →R.
The r-dimensional algebraic torus TN ⋍ (F q
∗
)r is defined by TN := HomZ(M,F q
∗
).
The multiplicative character e(m), m ∈M is the homomorphism
e(m) : T → F q
∗
defined by e(m)(t) = t(m) for t ∈ TN . Specifically, if {n1, . . . ,nr } and {m1, . . . ,mr }
are dual Z-bases of N and M and we denote uj := e(mj ), j = 1, . . . , r, then
we have an isomorphism TN ⋍ (F q
∗
)r sending t to (u1(t), . . . ,ur (t)). For m =
λ1m1 + · · ·+λrmr we have
e(m)(t) = u1(t)
λ1 · · · · · ur (t)
λr .
Given an r-dimensional integral convex polytope  in MR. The support
function h : NR → R is defined as h(n) := inf{〈m,n〉 |m ∈ } and  can be
reconstructed from the support function
h = {m ∈M | 〈m,n〉 ≥ h(n) ∀n ∈N }. (2.1)
The support function h is piecewise linear in the sense that NR is the
union of a non-empty finite collection of strongly convex polyhedral cones in
NR such that h is linear on each cone.
A fan is a collection ∆ of strongly convex polyhedral cones inNR such that
every face of σ ∈ ∆ is contained in ∆ and σ ∩σ ′ ∈ ∆ for all σ,σ ′ ∈ ∆.
The normal fan ∆ is the coarsest fan such that h is linear on each σ ∈ ∆, i.e.
for all σ ∈ ∆ there exists lσ ∈M such that
h(n) = 〈lσ ,n〉 ∀n ∈ σ. (2.2)
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The 1-dimensional cones ρ ∈ ∆ are generated by unique primitive elements
n(ρ) ∈N ∩ ρ such that ρ = R≥0n(ρ).
Upon refinement of the normal fan, we can assume that two successive
pairs of n(ρ)’s generate the lattice and we obtain the refined normal fan.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 present examples of polytopes with Figure 3 and
Figure 4 showing their corresponding refined normal fans.
2.1.1 Examples
Let q = pn, where p is a prime.
Example 2.1. Let d be a positive integer and let  be the polytope inMR with
vertices (0,0), (d,d), (0,2d), see Figure 1. Assume that 2d < q − 1. We have that
n(ρ1) =
(
1
0
)
, n(ρ2) =
(
−1
1
)
, n(ρ3) =
(
−1
0
)
and n(ρ4) =
(
−1
−1
)
.
Let σ1 be the cone generated by n(ρ1) and n(ρ2), σ2 be the cone generated
by n(ρ2) and n(ρ3) , σ3 the cone generated by n(ρ3) and n(ρ4) and σ4 the cone
generated by n(ρ4) and n(ρ1).
The support function is:
h
(
n1
n2
)
=

(
0
0
)
.
(
n1
n2
)
if
(
n1
n2
)
∈ σ1,(
d
d
)
.
(
n1
n2
)
if
(
n1
n2
)
∈ σ2,(
d
d
)
.
(
n1
n2
)
if
(
n1
n2
)
∈ σ3,(
0
2d
)
.
(
n1
n2
)
if
(
n1
n2
)
∈ σ4.
Example 2.2. Let d be a positive integer and let  be the polytope inMR with
vertices (0,0), (d,0), (0,d), see Figure 1. Assume that d < q − 1. We have that
n(ρ1) =
(
1
0
)
, n(ρ2) =
(
0
1
)
, n(ρ3) =
(
−1
−1
)
.
Let σ1 be the cone generated by n(ρ1) and n(ρ2), σ2 be the cone generated
by n(ρ2) and n(ρ3) and σ3 the cone generated by n(ρ3) and n(ρ1).
The support function is:
h
(
n1
n2
)
=

(
0
0
)
.
(
n1
n2
)
if
(
n1
n2
)
∈ σ1,(
d
0
)
.
(
n1
n2
)
if
(
n1
n2
)
∈ σ2,(
0
d
)
.
(
n1
n2
)
if
(
n1
n2
)
∈ σ3.
Example 2.3. Let d,e be positive integers and let  be the polytope inMR with
vertices (0,0), (d,0), (d,e), (0, e), see Figure 1. Assume that d < q − 1 and that
e < q − 1. We have that n(ρ1) =
(
1
0
)
, n(ρ2) =
(
0
1
)
, n(ρ3) =
(
−1
0
)
and n(ρ4) =
(
0
−1
)
.
Let σ1 be the cone generated by n(ρ1) and n(ρ2), σ2 be the cone generated by
n(ρ2) and n(ρ3) , σ3 the cone generated by n(ρ3) and n(ρ4) and σ4 the cone
generated by n(ρ4) and n(ρ1).
The support function is:
h
(
n1
n2
)
=

(
0
0
)
.
(
n1
n2
)
if
(
n1
n2
)
∈ σ1,(
d
0
)
.
(
n1
n2
)
if
(
n1
n2
)
∈ σ2,(
d
e
)
.
(
n1
n2
)
if
(
n1
n2
)
∈ σ3,(
0
e
)
.
(
n1
n2
)
if
(
n1
n2
)
∈ σ4.
3
Example 2.4. Let d,e, r be positive integers and let  be the polytope in MR
with vertices (0,0), (d,0), (d,e + rd), (0, e), see Figure 2. Assume that d < q − 1,
that e < q − 1 and that e + rd < q − 1. We have that n(ρ1) =
(
1
0
)
, n(ρ2) =
(
0
1
)
,
n(ρ3) =
(
−1
0
)
and n(ρ4) = (
r
−1 ). Let σ1 be the cone generated by n(ρ1) and n(ρ2),
σ2 be the cone generated by n(ρ2) and n(ρ3) , σ3 the cone generated by n(ρ3)
and n(ρ4) and σ4 the cone generated by n(ρ4) and n(ρ1). The support function
is:
h
(
n1
n2
)
=

(
0
0
)
.
(
n1
n2
)
if
(
n1
n2
)
∈ σ1,(
d
0
)
.
(
n1
n2
)
if
(
n1
n2
)
∈ σ2,(
d
e+rd
)
.
(
n1
n2
)
if
(
n1
n2
)
∈ σ3,(
0
e
)
.
(
n1
n2
)
if
(
n1
n2
)
∈ σ4.
2
q- 1
1q-d
d
d
q- 1
d
q-
q- 1
e
d 1
Figure 1: The polytope of Example 2.1 is the left triangle with vertices
(0,0), (d,d), (0,2d). The polytope of Example 2.2 is the right triangle with ver-
tices (0,0), (d,0), (0,d). The polytope of Example 2.3 is the square with vertices
(0,0), (d,0), (d,e), (0, e).
2.2 The toric variety and the Cartier divisor associated to a
fan
Notation as in Section 1.1 and Section 2.1.
The toric surface X associated to the refined normal fan ∆ of  is
X =
⋃
σ∈∆
Uσ
4
de
q-1
q-1
Figure 2: The polytope of Example 2.4 is the polytope with vertices
(0,0), (d,0), (d,e + rd), (0, e).
Figure 3: The refined normal fans of the polytopes in Figure 1.
Figure 4: The normal fan of the polytope in Figure 2.
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where Uσ is the Fq-valued points of the affine scheme Spec(F q[Sσ ]), i.e.
Uσ = {u : Sσ → F q | u(0) = 1, u(m+m
′) = u(m)u(m′ ) ∀m,m′ ∈ Sσ },
where Sσ is the additive subsemigroup ofM
Sσ = {m ∈M | 〈m,y〉 ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ σ} .
The toric surface X is irreducible, non-singular and complete, see Oda (1988,
Chapter 1). If σ,τ ∈ ∆ and τ is a face of σ, then Uτ is an open subset of Uσ .
Obviously, S0 = M and U0 = TN such that the algebraic torus TN is an open
subset of X.
TN acts algebraically on X. On u ∈Uσ the action of t ∈ TN is obtained as
(tu)(m) := t(m)u(m) m ∈ Sσ
such that tu ∈ Uσ andUσ is TN -stable. The orbits of this action is in one-to-one
correspondance with ∆. For each σ ∈ ∆ let
orb(σ) := {u :M ∩σ → Fq
∗
| u is a group homomorphism}.
Then orb(σ) is a TN orbit in X. Define V (σ) to be the closure of orb(σ) in X.
A ∆-linear support function h gives rise to the Cartier divisor Dh. Let ∆(1)
be the 1-dimensional cones in ∆, then
Dh := −
∑
ρ∈∆(1)
h(n(ρ))V (ρ).
In particular
Dm = div(e(−m)) m ∈M.
Following Oda (1988, Lemma 2.3), we have the lemma.
Lemma 2.5. Let h be a ∆-linear support function with associated Cartier divisor
Dh and convex polytope h defined in (2.1). The vector space H
0(X,OX (Dh)) of
global sections of OX (Dh), i.e. rational functions f on X such that div(f )+Dh ≥ 0
has dimension #(M ∩h) and has {e(m) |m ∈M ∩h} as a basis.
2.2.1 Examples
In Example 2.1
Dh := −
∑
ρ∈∆(1)
h(n(ρ))V (ρ) = d V (ρ3) + 2d V (ρ4)
and
dimH0(X,OX (Dh)) = (d +1)
2.
In Example 2.2
Dh := −
∑
ρ∈∆(1)
h(n(ρ))V (ρ) = d V (ρ3)
6
and
dimH0(X,OX (Dh)) =
(d +1)(d +2)
2
.
In Example 2.3
Dh := −
∑
ρ∈∆(1)
h(n(ρ))V (ρ) = d V (ρ3) + eV (ρ4)
and
dimH0(X,OX (Dh)) = (d +1)(e +1).
In Example 2.4
Dh := −
∑
ρ∈∆(1)
h(n(ρ))V (ρ) = d V (ρ3) + eV (ρ4)
and
dimH0(X,OX (Dh)) = (d +1)(e +1) + r
d(d +1)
2
.
2.3 Polytopes, Cartier divisors and Intersection theory
For a fixed linebundle L on X, given an effective divisor D such that L =
OX (D), the fundamental question to answer is: Howmany points from a fixed
set P of rational points are in the support of D. This question is treated in
general in Hansen (2001b) using intersection theory, see Fulton (1998). Here
we will apply the same methods when X is a toric surface.
For a ∆-linear support function h and a 1-dimensional cone ρ ∈ ∆(1), we
will determine the intersection number (Dh;V (ρ)) between the Cartier divisor
Dh and V (ρ)) = P
1. This number is obtained in Oda (1988, Lemma 2.11). The
cone ρ is the common face of two 2-dimensional cones σ ′ ,σ ′′ ∈ ∆(2). Choose
primitive elements n′ ,n′′ ∈N such that
n′ + n′′ ∈ Rρ
σ ′ +Rρ = R≥0n
′ +Rρ
σ ′′ +Rρ = R≥0n
′′ +Rρ
Lemma 2.6. For any lρ ∈M , such that h coincides with lρ on ρ, let h = h−lρ . Then
(Dh;V (ρ)) = −(h(n
′) + h(n′′)).
In the 2-dimensional non-singular case, let n(ρ) be a primitive generator
for the 1-dimensional cone ρ. There exists an integer a such that
n′ + n′′ + an(ρ) = 0,
V (ρ) is itself a Cartier divisor and the above gives the self-intersection number
(V (ρ);V (ρ)) = a.
More generally, the self-intersection number of a Cartier divisor Dh is ob-
tained in Oda (1988, Prop. 2.10).
7
Lemma 2.7. Let Dh be a Cartier divisor and let h be the polytope associated to h,
see (2.1). Then
(Dh;Dh) = 2vol2(h),
where vol2 is the normalized Lesbesgue-measure.
In case of Example 2.4 the intersection table becomes
V (ρ1) V (ρ2) V (ρ3) V (ρ4)
V (ρ1) −r 1 0 1
V (ρ2) 1 0 1 0
V (ρ3) 0 1 r 1
V (ρ4) 1 0 1 0
3 Toric Codes
In Hansen (1998), Hansen (2000) and Hansen (2002) we introduced toric
codes and presented a general method to obtain the dimension and a lower
bound for the minimal distance of a toric code.
3.1 The construction
Let M ≃Zr be a free Z-module of rank r over the integers Z.
Definition 3.1. For any subset U ⊆M , let Fq[U ] be the linear span in Fq[X
±1
1 ,
. . . ,X±1r ] of the monomials
{Xu = Xu11 · · · · ·X
ur
r | u = (u1, . . . ,ur ) ∈U}.
This is an Fq-vector space of dimension equal to the number of elements in U .
Let T (Fq) = (F
∗
q )
r be the Fq-rational points on the torus and let S ⊆ T (Fq) be
any subset. The linear map that evaluates elements in Fq[U ] at all the points
in S is denoted by πS :
πS : Fq[U ]→ Fq
|S |
f 7→ (f (P))P∈S .
In this notation π{P}(f ) = f (P).
The toric code is the image CU = πS (Fq[U ]).
Remark 3.2 (r = 1, Reed–Solomon codes). Consider the special case, where
M ≃Z, U =  = [0,k − 1] ⊆MR =M ⊗ZR and S = T (Fq) = Fq
∗.
The toric code C associated to  is the linear code of length n = (q − 1)
presented in Definition 1.1 with S = {x1, . . . ,xn}.
Remark 3.3 (r = 2). Consider the special case, where M ≃ Z2, U =  ⊆MR =
M ⊗Z R is an integral convex polytope and S = T (Fq) = Fq
∗ ×Fq
∗.
Let ξ ∈ Fq be a primitive element. For any i such that 0 ≤ i ≤ q−1 and any j
such that 0 ≤ j ≤ q−1, we let Pij = (ξ
i ,ξ j ) ∈ S = Fq
∗×Fq
∗. Letm1,m2 be aZ-basis
forM . For any m = λ1m1 +λ2m2 ∈M ∩, we let e(m)(Pij ) := (ξ
i )λ1 (ξ j )λ2 .
8
The toric code C associated to  is the linear code of length n = (q − 1)
2
generated by the vectors
{(e(m)(Pij ))i=0,...,q−1;j=0,...,q−1 |m ∈M ∩}.
Remark 3.4. The toric codes can as evaluation codes be presented in the con-
text of toric varieties in the notation of Section 2.2.
For each t ∈ T (Fq) = (F
∗
q )
r we evaluate the rational functions in H0(X,OX (Dh))
H0(X,OX (Dh))→ F q
∗
f 7→ f (t).
Let H0(X,OX (Dh))
Frob denote the rational functions in H0(X,OX (Dh)) that are
invariant under the action of the Frobenius. Evaluating in all points in T (Fq),
we obtain the code C:
H0(X,OX (Dh))
Frob → C ⊂ (Fq
∗)♯T (Fq)
f 7→ (f (t))t∈T (Fq) .
as in Definition 3.1.
We obtained the following results.
3.2 Results and examples
Theorem 3.5. Let d be a positive integer and let  be the polytope in MR with
vertices (0,0), (d,d), (0,2d), see Figure 1. Assume that 2d < q−1. The toric code C
has length equal to (q−1)2, dimension equal to #(M ∩) = (d +1)2 (the number of
lattice points in ) and minimal distance is equal to (q − 1)2 − 2d(q − 1).
Theorem 3.6. Let d be a positive integer and let  be the polytope in MR with
vertices (0,0), (d,0), (0,d), see Figure 1. Assume that d < q − 1. The toric code C
has length equal to (q − 1)2 , dimension equal to #(M ∩) = (d +1)(d +2)/2 (the
number of lattice points in ) and minimal distance is equal to (q − 1)2 − d(q − 1).
Theorem 3.7. Let d,e be positive integers and let  be the polytope in MR with
vertices (0,0), (d,0), (d,e), (0, e), see Figure 1. Assume that d < q − 1 and that e <
q−1. The toric code C has length equal to (q−1)
2 , dimension equal to #(M∩) =
(d + 1)(e + 1) (the number of lattice points in ) and minimal distance is equal to
(q − 1)2 − (d(q − 1) + (q − 1− d)e) = (q − 1− d)(q − 1− e).
Theorem 3.8. Let d,e, r be positive integers and let  be the polytope inMR with
vertices (0,0), (d,0), (d,e + rd), (0, e), see Figure 2. Assume that d < q − 1, that e <
q−1 and that e+rd < q−1. The toric code C has length equal to (q−1)
2, dimension
equal to #(M ∩) = (d +1)(e +1) + rd(d +1)/2 (the number of lattice points in )
and minimal distance is equal to
Min{(q − 1− d)(q − 1− e), (q − 1)(q − 1− e − rd)} .
In Figure 5, we have plotted for q = 16 and q = 32 the xy-diagrams for the
codes obtained, where x for a given code is the rate of the code, that is the
fraction dimensionlength , and y is the relative minimal distance
minimal distance
length .
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00.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Figure 5: For all possible codes obtained by Theorem 3.8 a point is marked in
the usual xy-diagram, where x for a given code is the rate of the code, i.e., the
fraction dimensionlength , and y is the relative minimal distance
minimal distance
length . The
left diagram is for the case q = 16 and the right is for the case q = 32.
In Section 3.2.1 we present the method using toric varieties, their cohomol-
ogy and intersection theory to obtain bounds for the number of rational zeroes
of a rational function, which can be used to prove the theorems on dimension
and minimal distance of the codes C presented above.
3.2.1 Determination of parameters using intersection theory
Let m1 = (1,0). The Fq-rational points of T ≃ Fq
∗
×F q
∗
belong to the q−1 lines
on X given by
∏
η∈Fq
(e(m1) − η) = 0. Let 0 , f ∈ H
0(X,OX (Dh)) and assume
that f is zero along precisely a of these lines. As e(m1)− η and e(m1) have the
same divisors of poles, they have equivalent divisors of zeroes, so
(div(e(m1)− η))0 ∼ (div(e(m1)))0.
Therefore,
div(f ) +Dh − a(div(e(m1)))0 ≥ 0
or equivalently,
f ∈H0(X,OX (Dh − a(div(e(m1)))0).
In the cases of all the theorems this implies that a ≤ d according to Lemma 2.5.
On any of the other q − 1 − a lines, the number of zeroes of f is according to
Hansen (2001b) at most the intersection number:
(Dh − a(div(e(m1)))0; (div(e(m1)))0). (3.1)
This number can be calculated using Lemma 2.6 and Lemma 2.7. In the situ-
ation of Theorem 3.5, the number is 2d − a · 2 · (12 · 1 · 2) = 2d − 2a and in the
situation of Theorem 3.6, it is d−a ·2 ·(12 ·1 ·1) = d−a (in both cases the volume-
element is shown as gray in Figure 1). In the situation of Theorem 3.7, the
volume-element is the line segment shown in bold in Figure 1 and the num-
ber is e. As 0 ≤ a ≤ d the total number of zeroes for f in the three cases is at
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most:
a(q − 1) + (q − 1− a)(2d − 2a) ≤ (q − 1)2d
a(q − 1) + (q − 1− a)(d − a) ≤ d(q − 1)
a(q − 1) + (q − 1− a)e ≤ d(q − 1) + (q − 1− d)e
In case of Theorem 3.8 the intersection number (3.1) is easily calculated using
the intersection table above and that (div(e(m1)))0 = V (ρ1) + rV (ρ4).We get(
Dh − a(div(e(m1)))0; (div(e(m1)))0
)
= e + (d − a)r.
As 0 ≤ a ≤ d, the total number of zeroes for f is at most
a(q − 1) + (q − 1− a)(e+ (d − a)r)
≤max{d(q − 1) + (q − 1− d)e, (q − 1)(e + dr)}.
This implies in all cases that the evaluation maps
H0(X,OX (Dh))
Frob → C ⊂ (Fq
∗)♯T (Fq)
f 7→ (f (t))t∈T (Fq)
are injective and that the dimensions and the lower bounds for the minimal
distances of the toric codes are as claimed.
To see that the lower bounds for the minimal distances are in fact the true
minimal distances, we exhibit codewords of minimal weight.
In the case of Theorem 3.5, we let b1, . . . ,b2d ∈ Fq
∗ be pairwise different
elements. Then the function
(y − b1) · · · · · (y − b2d ) ∈H
0(X,OX (Dh))
Frob
evaluates to zero in the (q − 1)(2d) points
(x,bj ), x ∈ Fq
∗, j = 1, . . . ,2d
and gives a codeword of weight (q − 1)2 − 2d(q − 1).
In the case of Theorem 3.6, we let b1, . . . ,bd ∈ Fq
∗ be pairwise different ele-
ments. Then the function
(y − b1) · · · · · (y − bd ) ∈H
0(X,OX (Dh))
Frob
evaluates to zero in the (q − 1)d points
(x,bj ), x ∈ Fq
∗, j = 1, . . . ,d
and gives a codeword of weight (q − 1)2 − 2d(q − 1).
In the case of Theorem 3.7 and Theorem 3.8, we let b1, . . . ,be+rd ∈ Fq
∗ be
pairwise different elements. Then the function
xd(y − b1) · · · · · (y − be+rd ) ∈H
0(X,OX (Dh))
Frob
evaluates to zero in the (q − 1)(e + rd) points
(x,bj ),x ∈ Fq
∗, j = 1, . . . , e + rd
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and gives a codeword of weight (q−1)2− (q−1)(e+ rd) = (q−1)(q−1− (e+ rd)).
On the other hand, we let a1, . . . ,ad ∈ Fq
∗ be pairwise different elements and
let b1, . . . ,be ∈ Fq
∗ be pairwise different elements. Then the function
(x − a1) · · · · · (x − ad)(y − b1) · · · · · (y − be) ∈H
0(X,OX (Dh))
Frob
evaluates to zero in the d(q − 1) + (q − 1)e − de points
(ai ,y), (x,bj ), x,y ∈ Fq
∗, i = 1, . . . e, j = 1, . . . ,d
and gives a codeword of weight (q − 1− d)(q − 1− e).
Remark 3.9. Ourmethod to estimate the minimum distance of toric codes has
subsequently been supplemented, e.g., Little and Schenck (2006), Soprunov and Soprunova
(2008/09), Little and Schwarz (2007), Ruano (2007), Beelen and Ruano (2009),Little
(2013) Soprunov (2015), and Little (2015).
3.3 Translation
Let U ⊆ M be a subset, let v ∈ M and consider translation v +U := {v + u |
u ∈ U} ⊆M .
Lemma 3.10. Translation induces an isomorphism of vector spaces
Fq[U ]→ Fq[v +U ]
f 7→ f v := Xv · f .
We have that
(i) The evaluations of πT (Fq)(f ) and πT (Fq)(f
v) have the same number of zeroes
on T (Fq).
(ii) The minimal number of zeros on T (Fq) of evaluations of elements in Fq[U ]
and Fq[v +U ] are the same.
(iii) For v = (v1, . . . ,vr )with vi divisible by q−1, the evaluations πS (f ) and πS (f
v)
are the same for any subset S of T (Fq).
The lemma and generalizations have been used in several articles classify-
ing toric codes, e.g., Little and Schenck (2006).
An immediate consequence of (iii) above is the following corollary, which
also can be found in Ruano (2007, Theorem 3.3).
Corollary 3.11. Let U ⊆M be a subset and let
U¯ := {(u¯1, . . . , u¯r ) | u¯i ∈ {0, . . . ,q − 2} and u¯i ≡ ui mod q − 1}
be its reduction modulo q − 1. Then πS (Fq[U ]) = πS (Fq[U¯ ]) for any subset S ⊆
T (Fq).
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3.4 Dual toric code
Proposition 3.13 exhibits the dual code of the toric code C = πS (Fq[U ]) de-
fined in Definition 3.1.
Let U ⊆M be a subset, define its opposite as −U := {−u | u ∈ U} ⊆M . The
opposite maps the monomial Xu to X−u and induces by linearity an isomor-
phism of vector spaces
Fq[U ]→ Fq[−U ]
Xu 7→ Xˆu := X−u
f 7→ fˆ .
On Fq
|T (Fq)|, we have the inner product
(a0, . . . ,an) ⋆ (b0, . . . ,bn) =
n∑
l=0
albl ∈ Fq,
with n = |T (Fq)| − 1.
Lemma 3.12. Let f ,g ∈ Fq[M] and assume f , gˆ , then
πT (Fq)(f ) ⋆ πT (Fq)(g) = 0.
Let
H = {0,1, . . . ,q − 2} × · · · × {0,1, . . . ,q − 2} ⊂M .
With this inner product we obtain the following proposition, e.g. Bras-Amorós and O’Sullivan
(2008, Proposition 3.5) and Ruano (2009, Theorem 6).
Proposition 3.13. Let U ⊆H be a subset. Then we have
(i) For f ∈ Fq[U ] and g < Fq[−H \ −U ], we have that πT (Fq)(f ) ⋆ πT (Fq)(g) = 0.
(ii) The orthogonal complement to πT (Fq)(Fq[U ]) in Fq
|T (Fq)| is
πT (Fq)(Fq[−H \ −U ]),
i.e., the dual code of C = πT (Fq)(Fq[U ]) is πT (Fq)(Fq[−H \ −U ]).
An example is shown in Figure 6.
4 Secret Sharing Schemes from toric varieties and codes
Massey’s method for constructing linear secret sharing schemes from error-
correcting codes is applied to codes obtained using toric varieties. The schemes
obtained are ideal and the number of players is (q −1)r −1 for any positive in-
teger r. Examples of schemes which are quasi-threshold and have strong mul-
tiplication with respect to certain adversary structures are also presented. In
particular, for any pair of integers a,b with 0 ≤ b ≤ a ≤ q − 2, using toric sur-
faces, schemes with (q−1)2−1 players are given whose reconstruction thresh-
old (i.e., the smallest integer r such that any set of at least r of the shares
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e + rd

H
−
−H \ −
q − 2
−(q − 2)
(q
−
2
)
−
(q
−
2
)
Figure 6: Hirzebruch surfaces. The convex polytope H with vertices (0,0), (q−
2,0), (q − 2,q − 2), (0,q − 2), the convex polytope  with vertices (0,0), (d,0),
(d,e+rd), (0, e) and their opposite convex polytopes −H and −. Also the (non-
convex) polytope −H \ − is depicted.
determines the secret) is at most 1 + (q − 1)2 − (q − 1 − a) and whose privacy
threshold (i.e., the largest integer t such that no set of t or fewer shares deter-
mines the secret) is at least b − 1. The schemes have t-strong multiplication
(i.e., privacy threshold t, and the product of any subset of n − t shares (where
n is the number of players) obtained by removing any t shares determines
the product of the secrets) with respect to the threshold adversary structure if
t ≤min{b − 1, (q − 2− 2a)− 1}.
For publication, see Hansen (2017b).
4.1 Secret sharing
Secret sharing schemes were introduced in Blakley (1979) and Shamir (1979)
and provide amethod to split a secret into several pieces of information (shares)
such that any large enough subset of the shares determines the secret, while
any small subset of shares provides no information on the secret.
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Example 4.1 (Shamir Secret Sharing). Let x1, . . . ,xn ∈ Fq be distinct elements.
Let s0 ∈ Fq be the secret to be shared. Choose a1, . . . ad ∈ Fq at random and let
f (X) = s0 + a1X + . . . adX
d ∈ Fq[X].
The n shares are the values f (xi ), i = 1, . . . ,n. Knowing at least d +1 shares,
we can reconstruct f (X) by interpolation, and determine the secret s0, whereas
knowing d or fewer shares gives no information on the secret.
Secret sharing schemes have found applications in cryptography, when the
schemes have certain algebraic properties. Linear secret sharing schemes (LSSS)
are schemes where the secrets s and their associated shares (a1, . . . ,an) are el-
ements in a vector space over some finite ground field Fq. The schemes are
called ideal if the secret s and the shares ai are elements in that ground field Fq.
Specifically, if s, s˜ ∈ Fq are two secrets with share vectors (a1, . . . an), (a˜1, . . . a˜n) ∈
Fq
n, then the share vector of the secret s+λs˜ ∈ Fq is (a1+λa˜1, . . . ,an+λa˜n) ∈ Fq
n
for any λ ∈ Fq.
The reconstruction threshold of the linear secret sharing scheme is the small-
est integer r such that any set of at least r of the shares a1, . . . ,an determines
the secret s. The privacy threshold is the largest integer t such that no set of t
(or fewer) elements of the shares a1, . . . ,an determines the secret s. The scheme
is said to have t-privacy.
An ideal linear secret sharing scheme is said to have multiplication if the
product of the shares determines the product of the secrets. It has t-strong
multiplication if it has t-privacy and has multiplication for any subset of n − t
shares obtained by removing any t shares.
The properties of multiplication was introduced in Cramer et al. (2000).
Such schemes with multiplication can be utilized in the domain of multiparty
computation (MPC), see Chaum et al. (1988), Ben-Or et al. (1988), Cramer et al.
(2015) and Cascudo (2010).
4.1.1 Basic definitions and concepts – Linear Secret Sharing
Schemes (LSSS)
This section presents basic definitions and concepts pertaining to linear se-
cret sharing schemes as introduced in Massey (2001), Cramer et al. (2000),
Chen and Cramer (2006) and Chen et al. (2007).
Let Fq be a finite field with q elements.
An ideal linear secret sharing schemeM over a finite field Fq on a set P of n
players is given by a positive integer e, a sequence V1, . . .Vn of 1-dimensional
linear subspaces Vi ⊂ Fq
e and a non-zero vector u ∈ Fq
e.
An adversary structure A, for a secret sharing schemeM on the set of play-
ers P , is a collection of subsets of P , with the property that subsets of sets in
A are also sets in A. In particular, the adversary structure At,n consists of all
the subsets of size at most t of the set P of n players, and the access structure
Γr,n consists of all the subsets of size at least r of the set P of n players.
For any subset A of players, let VA =
∑
i∈AVi be the Fq-subspace spanned
by all the Vi for i ∈ A.
The access structure Γ(M) ofM consists of all the subsets B of players with
u ∈ VB, and A(M) consists of all the other subsets A of players, that is A <
Γ(M).
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A linear secret sharing scheme M is said to reject a given adversary struc-
ture A, if A ⊆ A(M). Therefore A ∈ A(M) if and only if there is a linear map
from Fq
e to Fq vanishing on VA, while non-zero on u.
The scheme M works as follows. For i = 1, . . . n, let vi ∈ Vi be bases for the
1-dimensional vector spaces. Let s ∈ Fq be a secret. Choose at random a linear
morphism φ : Fq
e → Fq, subject to the condition φ(u) = s, and let ai = φ(vi ) for
i = 1, . . . ,n be the shares
φ : Fq
e → Fq
u 7→ s
vi 7→ ai for i = 1, . . . ,n.
Then
– the shares {ai = φ(vi )}i∈A determine the secret s = φ(u) uniquely if and
only if A ∈ Γ(M),
– the shares {ai = φ(vi )}i∈A reveal no information on the secret s = φ(u),
i.e., when A ∈ A(M).
Definition 4.2. LetM be a linear secret sharing scheme.
The reconstruction threshold ofM is the smallest integer r so that any set of
at least r of the shares a1, . . . ,an determines the secret s, i.e., Γr,n ⊆ Γ(M).
The privacy threshold is the largest integer t so that no set of t (or less)
elements of the shares a1, . . . ,an determine the secret s, i.e., At,n ⊆ A(M). The
schemeM is said to have t-privacy.
Definition 4.3. An ideal linear secret sharing scheme M has the strong mul-
tiplication property with respect to an adversary structure A if the following
holds.
(1) M rejects the adversary structure A.
(2) Given two secrets s and s˜. For each A ∈ A, the products ai · a˜i of all the
shares of the players i < A determine the product s · s˜ of the two secrets.
4.2 Secret sharing from toric codes – the Massey
construction
Linear secret sharing schemes obtained from linear codes were introduced by
James L. Massey in Massey (2001) and were generalized in Chen et al. (2007,
Section 4.1). A scheme with n players is obtained from a linear C code of
length n+1 and dimension k with privacy threshold t = d ′ −2 and reconstruc-
tion threshold r = n − d + 2, where d is the minimum distance of the code and
d ′ the minimum distance of the dual code.
We utilize the Massey construction to obtain linear secret sharing schemes
from toric codes.
Under certain conditions the linear secret sharing schemes from toric codes
have the strong multiplication property.
This method of toric varieties also applies to construct algebraic geometric
ideal secret sharing schemes (LSSS) defined over a finite ground fieldFq with q
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elements. In a certain sense our construction resembles that of Chen and Cramer
(2006), where LSSS schemes were constructed from algebraic curves. However,
the methods of obtaining the parameters are completely different.
The linear secret sharing schemes we obtain are ideal and the number of
players can be of the magnitude qr for any positive integer r. They are ob-
tained by evaluating certain rational functions in Fq-rational points on toric
varieties.
The thresholds and conditions for strong multiplication are derived from
estimates on the maximal number of zeroes of rational functions obtained via
the cohomology and intersection theory on the underlying toric variety. In
particular, we focus on toric surfaces.
We present examples of linear secret sharing schemes which are quasi-
threshold and have strong multiplication Cramer et al. (2000) with respect to
certain adversary structures.
Specifically, for any pair of integers a,b with 0 ≤ b ≤ a ≤ q − 2, we produce
linear secret sharing schemes with (q−1)2−1 players which are quasi-threshold,
i.e., the reconstruction threshold is at most 1+(q−1)2−(q−1−a) and the privacy
threshold is at least b−1. The schemes have t-strong multiplicationwith respect
to the threshold adversary structure if t ≤min{b − 1, (q − 2− 2a)− 1}.
4.2.1 The construction of Linear Secret Sharing Schemes (LSSS)
With notation as in Definition 3.1.
Definition 4.4. Let S ⊆ T (Fq) be any subset so that P0 ∈ S. The linear secret
sharing schemes (LSSS)M(U ) with support S and n = |S |−1 players is obtained
as follows:
– Let s0 ∈ Fq be a secret value. Select f ∈ Fq[U ] at random, such that
π{P0}(f ) = f (P0) = s0.
– Define the n shares as
πS\{P0}(f ) = (f (P))P∈S\{P0} ∈ Fq
|S |−1 = Fq
n.
The main objectives are to study privacy, reconstruction of the secret from
the shares and the property strong multiplication of the scheme as introduced
in Definition 4.2 and Definition 4.3.
Theorem 4.5. Let M(U ) be the linear secret sharing schemes of Definition 4.4
with (q − 1)r − 1 players.
Let r(U ) and t(U ) be the reconstruction and privacy thresholds of M(U ) as
defined in Definition 4.2.
Then
r(U ) ≥ (the maximum number of zeros of πT (Fq)(f )) + 2
t(U ) ≤ (q − 1)r − (the maximum number of zeros of πT (Fq)(g))− 2
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for some f ∈ Fq[U ] and for some g ∈ Fq[−H \ −U ], where
πT (Fq) : Fq[U ]→ Fq
|T (Fq)|
f 7→ πT (Fq)(f ) = (f (P))P∈T (Fq)
πT (Fq) : Fq[−H \ −U ]→ Fq
|T (Fq)|
g 7→ πT (Fq)(g) = (g(P))P∈T (Fq).
Proof. The minimal distance of an evaluation code and the maximum number
of zeros of a function add to the length of the code.
The bound for r(U ) is based on the minimum distance d of the code C =
πT (Fq)(Fq[U ]) ⊆ Fq
|T (Fq)|, the bound for t(U ) is base on the minimum distance
d ′ of the dual code C ′ = πT (Fq)(Fq[−H \ −U ] ⊆ Fq
|T (Fq)|, using Proposition 3.13
to represent the dual code as an evaluation code.
The codes have length |T (Fq)|, hence,
2r(U ) ≥ |T (Fq)| − d +2
= (the maximum number of zeros of πT (Fq)(f )) + 2
t(U ) ≤ d ′ − 2
= |T (Fq)| − (the maximum number of zeros of πT (Fq)(g))− 2.
The results follow from the construction in Massey (2001, Section 4.1).
Theorem 4.6. Let U ⊆ H ⊂ M and let U + U = {u1 + u2 | u1,u2 ∈ U} be the
Minkowski sum. Let
πT (Fq) : Fq[U +U ]→ Fq
|T (Fq)|
h 7→ πT (Fq)(h) = (h(P))P∈T (Fq).
The linear secret sharing schemesM(U ) of Definition 4.4 with n = (q − 1)r − 1
players, has strong multiplication with respect to At,n for t ≤ t(U ), where t(U ) is
the adversary threshold ofM(U ), if
t ≤ n− 1− (the maximal number of zeros of πT (Fq)(h))
for all h ∈ Fq[U +U ].
Proof. For A ∈ At,n, let B := T (Fq) \ ({P0} ∪ A) with |B| = n − t elements. For
f ,g ∈ Fq[U ], we have that f · g ∈ Fq[U +U ]. Consider the linear morphism
πB : Fq[U +U ]→ Fq
|B| (4.1)
h 7→ (h(P))P∈B. (4.2)
evaluating at the points in B.
By assumption h ∈ Fq[U +U ] can have at most n − t − 1 < n − t = |B| zeros,
therefore h cannot vanish identically on B, and we conclude that πB is injec-
tive. Consequently, the products f (P) · g(P) of the shares P ∈ B determine the
product of the secrets f (P0) · g(P0), and the scheme has strong multiplication
by definition.
To determine the product of the secrets from the product of the shares
amounts to decoding the linear code obtained as the image in (4.1).
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4.2.1.1 Hirzebruch surfaces and their associated Linear Secret Sharing
Schemes (LSSS).
Let d,e, r be positive integers and let  be the polytope in MR with vertices
(0,0), (d,0), (d,e+rd), (0, e) rendered in Figure 2 andwith refined normal fan de-
picted in Figure 4.We obtain the following result as a consequence of Theorem 4.5
and the bounds obtained in Theorem 3.8 on the number of zeros of functions
on such surfaces.
Theorem 4.7. Let  be the polytope inMR with vertices (0,0), (d,0), (d,e+rd), (0, e).
Assume that d ≤ q−2, e ≤ q−2 and that e+rd ≤ q−2. LetU =M∩ be the lattice
points in .
Let M(U ) be the linear secret sharing schemes of Definition 4.4 with support
T (Fq) and (q − 1)
2 − 1 players.
Then the number of lattice points in  is
|U | = |(M ∩)| = (d +1)(e +1) + r
d(d +1)
2
.
The maximal number of zeros of a function f ∈ Fq[U ] on T (Fq) is
max{d(q − 1) + (q − 1− d)e, (q − 1)(e + dr)}
and the reconstruction threshold as defined in Definition 4.2 ofM(U ) is
r(U ) = 1+max{d(q − 1) + (q − 1− d)e, (q − 1)(e + dr)}.
Remark 4.8. The polytope −H \ −U is not convex, so our method using in-
tersection theory does not determine the privacy threshold t(U ). It would be
interesting to examine the methods and results of Little and Schenck (2006),
Soprunov and Soprunova (2008/09), Little and Schwarz (2007), Ruano (2007),
Beelen and Ruano (2009),Little (2013) Soprunov (2015), and Little (2015) for
toric codes in this context.
Toric surfaces and their associated Linear Secret Sharing Scheme (LSSS)
with strong multiplication. Let a,b be positive integers 0 ≤ b ≤ a ≤ q − 2,
and let  be the polytope in MR with vertices (0,0), (a,0), (b,q − 2), (0,q − 2)
rendered in Figure 7 and with normal fan depicted in Figure 8.
Under these assumptions the polytopes , −H \ − and  + are convex
and we can use intersection theory on the associated toric surface to bound
the number of zeros of functions and thresholds.
The primitive generators of the 1-dimensional cones are
n(ρ1) =
(
1
0
)
, n(ρ2) =
(
0
1
)
, n(ρ3) =

−(q−2)
gcd(a−b,q−2)
−(a−b)
gcd(a−b,q−2)
 , n(ρ4) =
(
0
−1
)
.
For i = 1, . . . ,4, the 2-dimensional cones σi are shown in Figure 8. The faces
of σ1 are {ρ1,ρ2}, the faces of σ2 are {ρ2,ρ3}, the faces of σ3 are {ρ3,ρ4} and the
faces of σ4 are {ρ4,ρ1}.
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The support function of  is:
h
(
n1
n2
)
=

(
0
0
)
·
(
n1
n2
)
if
(
n1
n2
)
∈ σ1,
( a0 ) ·
(
n1
n2
)
if
(
n1
n2
)
∈ σ2,(
b
q−2
)
·
(
n1
n2
)
if
(
n1
n2
)
∈ σ3,(
0
q−2
)
·
(
n1
n2
)
if
(
n1
n2
)
∈ σ4.
(4.3)
The related toric surface is in general singular as {n(ρ2),n(ρ3)} and {n(ρ3),n(ρ4)}
are not bases for the latticeM . We can desingularize by subdividing the cones
σ2 and σ3, however, our calculations will only involve the cones σ1 and σ2, so
we refrain from that.
For all pairs of 1-dimensional cones ρi ,ρj ∈ ∆(1), i = 1, . . . ,4, the intersec-
tion numbers (V (ρi );V (ρj )) are determined by the methods above, however,
we only need the self-intersection number (V (ρ1);V (ρ1)), and as
n(ρ2) + n(ρ4) + 0 · n(ρ1) = 0 ,
we have that
(V (ρ1);V (ρ1)) = 0 (4.4)
by the remark following Lemma 2.6.
Theorem 4.9. Assume a,b are integers with 0 ≤ b ≤ a ≤ q − 2.
Let  be the polytope in MR with vertices (0,0), (a,0), (b,q − 2), (0,q − 2) ren-
dered in Figure 7, and let U =M ∩ be the lattice points in .
Let M(U ) be the linear secret sharing schemes of Definition 4.4 with support
T (Fq) and n = (q − 1)
2 − 1 players.
(i) The maximal number of zeros of πT (Fq)(f ) for f ∈ Fq[U ] is less than or equal
to
(q − 1)2 − (q − 1− a).
(ii) The reconstruction threshold as defined in Definition 4.2 satisfies
r(U ) ≤ 1+ (q − 1)2 − (q − 1− a).
(iii) The privacy threshold as defined in Definition 4.2 satisfies
t(U ) ≥ b − 1.
(iv) Assume 2a ≤ q−2. The secret sharing scheme has t-strong multiplication for
t ≤min{b − 1, (q − 2− 2a)− 1}.
Proof. Let m1 = (1,0). The Fq-rational points of T ≃ Fq
∗
× F q
∗
belong to the
q − 1 lines on X given by ∏
η∈F∗q
(e(m1)− η) = 0.
Let 0 , f ∈ H0(X,OX (Dh)). Assume that f is zero along precisely c of these
lines.
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As e(m1)− η and e(m1) have the same divisors of poles, they have equiva-
lent divisors of zeroes, so
(e(m1)− η)0 ∼ (e(m1))0.
Therefore
div(f ) +Dh − c(e(m1))0 ≥ 0
or equivalently
f ∈H0(X,OX (Dh − c(e(m1))0).
This implies that c ≤ a according to Lemma 2.5.
On any of the other q − 1− c lines the number of zeroes of f is at most the
intersection number
(Dh − c(e(m1))0; (e(m1))0).
This number can be calculated using Lemma 2.6 using the observation that
(e(m1))0 = V (ρ1).
We get from (4.3) and (4.4) that
(Dh − c(e(m1))0; (e(m1))0)
= (Dh; (e(m1))0)− c(e(m1))0; (e(m1))0)
= −h
(
0
1
)
− h
(
0
−1
)
= q − 2,
as lρ1 =
(
0
0
)
∈M .
As 0 ≤ c ≤ a, we conclude the total number of zeroes for f is at most
c(q − 1) + (q − 1− c)(q − 2) ≤ a(q − 1) + (q − 1− a)(q − 2) = (q − 1)2 − (q − 1− a)
proving (i).
According to Theorem 4.5, we have the inequality of (ii)
r(U ) ≤ 1+ (q − 1)2 − (q − 1− a).
We obtain (iii) by using the result in (i) on the polytope (q−2,q−2)+ (−H \
−) with vertices (0,0), (q − 2 − b,0), (q − 2 − a,q − 2) and (q − 2,q − 2). The
maximum number of zeros of πT (Fq)(g) for g ∈ Fq[−H \ −U ] is by Lemma 3.10
and the result in (i) less than or equal to (q−1)2−(q−1−(q−2−b)) = (q−1)2−1−b
and (iii) follows from Theorem 4.5.
To prove (iv) assume t ≤ (q−2−2a)−1 and t ≤ b−2.Wewill use Theorem 4.6.
Consider the Minkowski sum U +U and let V = U +U be its reduction
modulo q − 1 as in Corollary 3.11. Under the assumption 2a ≤ q − 2, we have
that V = U +U is the lattice points of the integral convex polytope with ver-
tices (0,0), (2a,0), (2b,q − 2) and (0,q − 2).
By the result in (i) the maksimum number of zeros of πT (Fq)(h) for h ∈
Fq[V ] is less than or equal to (q −1)
2 − (q −1−2a). As the number of players is
n = (q − 1)2 − 1, the right hand side of the condition (4.6) of Theorem 4.6 is at
least (q − 2− 2a)− 1, which by assumption is at least t.
By assumption t ≤ b−1 and from (iii) we have that b−1 ≤ t(U ). We conclude
that t ≤ t(U ).
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−H \ −
(q − 2,q − 2) +
(
−H \ −
)
(q
−
2
)−
b
(q
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2
)−
a
2a
−H
q − 2
−(q − 2)
q
−
2
−
(q
−
2
)
Figure 7: The convex polytopeH with vertices (0,0), (q−2,0), (q−2,q−2), (0,q−
2) and the convex polytope  with vertices (0,0), (a,0), (b,q − 2), (0,q − 2)) are
shown. Also their opposite convex polytopes −H and −, the complement
−H \ − and its translate (q − 2,q − 2) + (−H \ −) are depicted. Finally the
convex hull of the reduction modulo q−1 of the Minkowski sum U +U of the
lattice pointsU = ∩M in , is rendered. It has vertices (0,0), (2a,0), (2b,q−2)
and (0,q − 2).
5 Asymmetric Quantum Codes on Toric Surfaces
5.1 Introduction
In Hansen (2013) we applied our construction of Section 3 to obtain toric
codes suitable for constructing quantum codes by the Calderbank-Shor-Steane
method. Our constructions extended similar results obtained by A. Ashikhmin,
S. Litsyn and M.A. Tsfasman in Ashikhmin et al. (2001) from Goppa codes on
algebraic curves.
Works of Shor (1995) and Steane (1996c), Steane (1996a) initiated the study
and construction of quantum error-correcting codes. Calderbank and Shor (1996),
Shor (1996) and Steane (1999b) produced stabilizer codes (CSS) from linear
codes containing their dual codes. For details see for example Ashikhmin and Knill
(2001), Calderbank et al. (1998) and Steane (1998).
Asymmetric quantum error-correcting codes are quantum codes defined
over biased quantum channels: qubit-flip and phase-shift errors may have
equal or different probabilities. The code construction is the CSS construction
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ρ2
ρ3
ρ1
ρ4
σ1σ2
σ4σ3
n(ρ3) =
(
−(q−2)
gcd(a−b,q−2) ,
−(a−b)
gcd(a−b,q−2)
)
Figure 8: The normal fan and its 1-dimensional cones ρi , with primitive gen-
erators n(ρi ), and 2-dimensional cones σi for i = 1, . . . ,4 of the polytope  in
Figure 7.
based on two linear codes. The construction appeared originally in Evans et al.
(2007), Ioffe and Mézard (2007) and Stephens et al. (2008). We present new
families of toric surfaces, toric codes and associated asymmetric quantum
error-correcting codes.
5.2 The toric surfaces Xb and their intersection theory
Let Fq be the field with q elements and let r be an integer dividing q. Let b ∈Z
such that 0 ≤ b ≤ q − 2 with a := b + q−2r ≤ q − 2.
Let M be an integer lattice M ≃ Z2. Let N = HomZ(M,Z) be the dual
lattice with canonicalZ – bilinear pairing 〈−,−〉 :M×N →Z. LetMR =M⊗ZR
and NR =N ⊗Z R with canonical R - bilinear pairing 〈−,−〉 :MR ×NR → R.
Let b in MR be the 2-dimensional integral convex polytope in MR with
vertices (0,0), (a,0), (b,q − 2) and (0,q − 2) properly contained in the square
[0,q − 2]× [0,q − 2], see Figure 9. It is the Minkowski sum of the line segment
from (0,0) to (b,0) and the polytope 0, see Figure 10.
The support function hb : NR → R for b is defined as hb(n) := inf{〈m,n〉 |
m ∈ 0} and the polytope b can be reconstructed from the support function
b = {m ∈M | 〈m,n〉 ≥ h(n) ∀n ∈N }. (5.1)
The normal fan ∆b is the coarsest fan such that hb is linear on each σ ∈ ∆b,
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q − 2
b
a = b + q−2r
q − 2
Figure 9: The polytope b is the polytope with vertices (0,0), (a = b +
q−2
r ,0),
(b,q − 2), (0,q − 2).
q − 2
a = q−2r
q − 2
Figure 10: The polytope 0 is the polytope with vertices (0,0), (a =
q−2
r ,0),
(0,q − 2).
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V (ρ2)
V (ρ3)
V (ρ4)
V (ρ1)
Figure 11: The refined normal fan and the 1-dimensional cones of the poly-
tope 0 in Figure 10.
i.e. for all σ ∈ ∆b there exists lσ ∈M such that
hb(n) = 〈lσ ,n〉 ∀n ∈ σ. (5.2)
Upon refinement of the normal fan, we can assume that the generators of
any two successive pairs of 1-dimensional cones generate the lattice and we
obtain the refined normal fan.
The 1-dimensional cones in the refined normal fan ∆0 of the polytope 0
are generated by unique primitive elements n(ρ)
such that ρ = R≥0n(ρ), specifically
nρ1 =
(
1
0
)
, nρ2 =
(
0
1
)
, nρ3 =
(
−1
0
)
, nρ4 = (
−r
−1 ), (5.3)
see Figure 11.
There are four 2-dimensional cones σi in the refined normal fan ∆0 with
corresponding lσi as in (5.2):
– σ1 with faces ρ1, ρ2 and lσ1 =
(
0
0
)
– σ2 with faces ρ2, ρ3 and lσ1 =
(
q−2
r
0
)
– σ3 with faces ρ3, ρ4 and lσ1 =
(
q−2
r
0
)
– σ4 with faces ρ4, ρ1 and lσ1 =
(
0
q−2
)
.
The resulting toric surface Xb is irreducible, complete and non-singular
under the assumption that we are working with the refined normal fan.
Let h0 be the support function of the refined normal fan ∆0. Let Dh0 be the
associated Cartier divisor of, see Section 2.2.
By the methods of Section 2.3, we obtain:
(Dh0 ;V (ρ1)) = −(h0(nρ4 )) = q − 2, (5.4)
and
(V (ρ1);V (ρ1)) = r. (5.5)
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Theorem 5.1. Let Fq be the field with q elements and let r be an integer dividing
q. Let b ∈Z such that 0 ≤ b ≤ q − 2 with a := b + q−2r ≤ q − 2.
Let b in MR be the 2-dimensional integral convex polytope in MR with ver-
tices (0,0), (a,0), (b,q−2) and (0,q−2) contained in the square [0,q − 2]× [0,q − 2],
see Figure 9.
Let Cb be the corresponding toric code as defined in Section 3.
Then
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(i) n = length Cb = (q − 1)
2.
(ii) k = dimCb =
1
2
(
q−2
r +1
)
q + b(q − 1).
(iii) d(Cb) = (q − 1− a)(q − 1) (the minimum distance).
Proof. As we evaluate in (q −1)2 points on Xb the length is as claimed. The di-
mension dimCb equals the number of integral points in∆b, which is
1
2 (
q−2
r +1)q
+ b(q − 1).
Minimumdistance of the toric code in the special case b = 0. See figures 10
and 11.We bound the number of points in the support S = F ∗q ×F
∗
q ⊆ Xb, where
the rational functions in H0(X0,OX (Dh0))
Frob evaluates to zero.
The support S is stratified by the intersections with the zeros of e(m1)−ψ,
where ψ ∈ F ∗q . A rational function f can either vanish identically on a stratum
or have a finite number of zeroes along the stratum.
Identically vanishing on strata: Assume that f is identically zero along pre-
cisely A of these strata. As e(m1) − ψ and e(m1) have the same divisors of
poles, they have equivalent divisors of zeroes, so
(e(m1)−ψ)0 ∼ (e(m1))0.
Therefore
div(f ) +Dh0 −A(e(m1))0 ≥ 0
or equivalently
f ∈H0(X0,OX (Dh0 −A(e(m1))0).
Therefore A ≤ a by Lemma 2.5.
Vanishing in a finite number of points on a stratum: On any of the q − 1 − A
other strata, the number of zeroes of f is at most the intersection number
(Dh0 −A(e(m1))0; (e(m1))0) = (q − 2)−Ar (5.6)
following (5.4) and (5.5), see Hansen (2001a) .
Consequently, the number of zeros is at most A(q−1)+(q−1−A)(q−2−Ar)≤
(q − 1)2 − (q − 1− a)(q − 1) as A ≤ a and therefore d(C0) ≥ (q − 1− a)(q − 1).
Minimum distance of the toric code in the general case b > 0. See Figure 9.
The polytopeb with vertices (0,0), (a,0), (b,q−2) and (0,q−2) is theMinkowski
sum of the line segment from (0,0) to (b,0) and the polytope 0, see Figure 10.
Applying Little and Schenck (2006, Proposition 2.3) and the special case b = 0,
we have the inequality d(Ca) ≥ (q − 1− a)(q − 1) also in the general case.
For pairwise different x1, . . . ,xa ∈ F
∗
q the function (e(m1)−x1)(e(m1)−x2) . . .
(e(m1) − xa) ∈ H
0(X0,OX (Dh0)) vanishes in the a(q − 1) points (xi ,y), i = 1, . . . ,a
and y ∈ F ∗q . In conclusion, we have the equality d(Cb) = (q − 1− a)(q − 1).
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5.3 Asymmetric Quantum Codes
5.3.1 Notation
Let H be the Hilbert space H = Cq
n
= Cq ⊗Cq ⊗ · · · ⊗Cq. Let |x〉,x ∈ Fq be an
orthonormal basis for Cq. For a,b ∈ Fq, the unitary operators X(a) and Z(b) in
C
q are
X(a)|x〉 = |x+ a〉, Z(b)|x〉 = ωtr(bx)|x〉, (5.7)
where ω = exp(2πi/p) is a primitive pth root of unity and tr is the trace opera-
tion from Fq to Fp.
For a = (a1, . . . ,an) ∈ F
n
q and b = (b1, . . . ,bn) ∈ F
n
q
X(a) = X(a1)⊗ · · · ⊗X(an)
Z(b) = Z(b1)⊗ · · · ⊗Z(bn)
are the tensor products of n error operators.
With
Ex =
{
X(a) =
n⊗
i=1
X(ai )
∣∣∣a ∈ Fnq ,ai ∈ Fq},
Ez =
{
Z(b) =
n⊗
i=1
Z(bi )
∣∣∣ b ∈ Fnq ,bi ∈ Fq}
the error groups Gx and Gz are
Gx = {ω
cEx = ω
cX(a) |a ∈ Fnq , c ∈ Fp},
Gz = {ω
cEz = ω
cZ(b | b ∈ Fqnc ∈ Fp}.
It is assumed that the groupsGx andGz represent the qubit-flip and phase-
shift errors.
Definition 5.2 (Asymmetric quantum code). A q-ary asymmetric quantum
code Q, denoted by [[n,k,dz/dx]]q, is a q
k dimensional subspace of the Hilbert
space Cq
n
and can control all bit-flip errors up to ⌊dx−12 ⌋ and all phase-flip
errors up to ⌊dz−12 ⌋. The code Q detects (dx − 1) qubit-flip errors as well as
detects (dz − 1) phase-shift errors.
Let C1 and C2 be two linear error-correcting codes over the finite field Fq,
and let [n,k1,d1]q and [n,k2,d2]q be their parameters. For the dual codes C
⊥
i ,
we have dimC⊥i = n− ki and if C
⊥
1 ⊆ C2 then C
⊥
2 ⊆ C1.
Lemma 5.3. Let Ci for i = 1,2 be linear error-correcting codes with parameters
[n,ki ,di ]q such thatC
⊥
1 ⊆ C2 andC
⊥
2 ⊆ C1. Let dx =min{wt(C1\C
⊥
2 ),wt(C2\C
⊥
1 )},
and dz = max{wt(C1 \ C
⊥
2 ),wt(C2 \C
⊥
1 )}. Then there is an asymmetric quantum
code with parameters [[n,k1 + k2 − n,dz/dx]]q. The quantum code is pure to its
minimum distance, meaning that if wt(C1) = wt(C1 \C
⊥
2 ), then the code is pure to
dx, also if wt(C2) = wt(C2 \C
⊥
1 ), then the code is pure to dz.
This construction is well-known, see for example Ashikhmin and Knill
(2001), Calderbank et al. (1998), Shor (1995), Steane (1996c), Steane (1996b)
, Steane (1999a) Aly and Ashikhmin (2010). The error groups Gx and Gz can
be mapped to the linear codes C1 and C2.
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5.4 New Asymmetric Quantum Codes from Toric Codes
Let Fq be the field with q elements and let r be an integer dividing q. Let b ∈Z
such that 0 ≤ b ≤ (r − 1)(q − 2)/r. Then the polytope b with vertices (0,0),
(a = b+ q−2r ), (b,q−2), (0,q−2) is contained in [0,q−2]× [0,q−2]. Consider the
associated toric code Cb.
From the results in Section 3.4 we conclude that the dual code C⊥b is the
toric code associated to the polytope b⊥ with vertices (0,0), (a
⊥ = b⊥ + q−2r ),
(b⊥,q − 2), (0,q − 2) where b⊥ = (r−1)(q−2)r − b such that a
⊥ = q − 2− b.
For i = 1,2 let bi ∈Zwith 0 ≤ bi ≤ (r − 1)(q − 2)/r and b1+b2 ≥ (r − 1)(q − 2)/r.
We have the inclusions of polytopes b⊥2
⊆ b1 and b⊥1
⊆ b2 , see Figure 12,
and corresponding inclusions of the associated toric codes.
C⊥b2 = Cb
⊥
2
⊆ Cb1 , C
⊥
b1
= Cb⊥1 ⊆ Cb2 .
The nested codes gives by the construction of Lemma 5.3 and the discus-
sion above rise to an asymmetric quantum code Qb1 ,b2 .
Theorem 5.4 (Asymmetric quatum codes Qb1,b2 ). Let Fq be the field with q el-
ements and let r be an integer dividing q. For i = 1,2 let bi ,ai = bi +
q−2
r ∈ Z
0 ≤ bi ≤ (r − 1)(q − 2)/r and b1 + b2 ≥ (r − 1)(q − 2)/r.
Then there is an asymmetric quantum code Qb1 ,b2 with parameters [[(q − 1)
2,
1
2 (
q−2
r +1)q + (b1 + b2)(q − 1),dz/dx]]q, where
dz = (q − 1−min{b1,b2})(q − 1)
dx = (q − 1−max{b1,b2})(q − 1)
If b1 + b2 , (r − 1)(q − 2)/r the quantum code is pure to dx and dz.
Proof. The parameters and claims follow directly fromLemma 5.3 and Theorem 5.1.
6 Toric Codes, Multiplicative Structure and Decoding
The main theme is the inherent multiplicative structure on toric codes. The
multiplicative structure allows for decoding, resembling the decoding of Reed-
Solomon codes and aligns with decoding by error correcting pairs.
Toric codes have an inherent multiplicative structure.
In Hansen (2017a) we utilized the multiplicative structure to decode toric
codes, resembling the decoding of Reed-Solomon codes and decoding by error
correcting pairs, see
Pellikaan (1992) , Kötter (1992) andMárquez-Corbella and Pellikaan (2016).
6.1 Multiplicative structure
In the notation of Section 3 let  and ˜ be polyhedra inRr and let +˜ denote
their Minkowski sum. Let U = ∩Zr and U˜ = ˜∩Zr . The map
Fq[U ]⊕Fq[U˜ ]→ Fq[U + U˜ ]
(f ,g) 7→ f · g.
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b1b2
⊥ b2b1
⊥
0 a1 a2a2
⊥ a1
⊥
q − 2
Figure 12: The polytope bi is the polytope with vertices (0,0), (ai = bi +
q−2
r ,0), (bi ,q − 2), (0,q − 2). The polytopes giving the dual toric codes have ver-
tices (0,0), (a⊥i = b
⊥
i +
q−2
r ,0) ,(b
⊥
i ,q − 2), (0,q − 2), where b
⊥
i = q − 2− ai .
induces a multiplication on the associated toric codes
C ⊕C˜→ C+˜
(c, c˜) 7→ c ⋆ c˜
with coordinatewise multiplication of the codewords – the Schur product.
Our goal is to use the multiplicative structure to correct t errors on the
toric code C. This is achieved choosing another toric code C˜ that helps to
reduce error-correcting to a linear problem.
Let  and ˜ be polyhedra as above in R2, let + ˜ denote their Minkowski
sum. Assume from now on:
(1) |U˜ | > t, where U˜ = ˜∩Z2.
(2) d(C+˜) > t, where d(C+˜) is the minimum distance of C+˜.
(3) d(C˜) > n− d(C), where d(C) and d(C˜) are the minimum distances of
C and C˜.
6.1.1 Error-locating
Let the received word be y(P) = f (P) + e(P) for P ∈ T (Fq), with f ∈ Fq[U ] and
error e of Hamming-weight at most t with support T ⊆ T (Fq), such that |T | ≤ t.
From (1), it follows that there is a g ∈ Fq[U˜ ], such that g|T = 0 – an error-
locator. To find g , consider the linear map:
Fq[U˜ ]⊕Fq[U + U˜ ]→ Fq
n (6.1)
(g,h) 7→
(
g(P)y(P)− h(P)
)
P∈T (Fq)
. (6.2)
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As y(P)− f (P) = 0 for P < T (recall that the support of the error e is T ), we
have that g(P)y(P)− (g · f )(P) = 0 for all P ∈ T (Fq). That is (g,h = g · f ) is in the
kernel of (6.1).
Lemma 6.1. Let (g,h) be in the kernel of (6.1). Then g|T = 0 and h = g · f .
Proof.
e(P) = y(P)− f (P) for P ∈ T (Fq). (6.3)
Coordinate wise multiplication yields by (6.1)
g(P)e(P) = g(P)y(P)− g(P)f (P)
= h(P)− g(P)f (P)
for P ∈ T (Fq). The left hand side has Hamming weight at most t, the right
hand side is a code word in C+˜ with minimal distance strictly larger than t
by assumption (2). Therefore both sides equal 0.
6.1.2 Error-correcting
Lemma 6.2. Let (g,h) be in the kernel of (6.1) with g|T = 0 and g , 0. There is a
unique f such that h = g · f .
Proof. As in the above proof, we have
g(P)y(P)− g(P)f (P) = 0 for P ∈ T (Fq). (6.4)
Let Z(g) be the zero-set of g with T ⊆ Z(g). For P < Z(g), we have y(P) = f (P)
and there are at least d(C˜) > n − d(C) such points by (3). This determines f
uniquely as it is determined by the values in n− d(C) points.
Example 6.3. Let  be the convex polytope with vertices (0,0), (a,0) and
(0,a). Let ˜ be the convex polytope with vertices (0,0), (b,0) and (0,b). Their
Minkowski sum + ˜ is the convex polytope with vertices (0,0), (a+ b,0) and
(0,a+ b), see Figure 13.
FromHansen (2002, Theorem 1.3), we have that n = (q−1)2, |˜| = (b +1)(b +2)/2,
d(C) = (q−1)(q−1−a), d(C˜) = (q−1)(q−1−b) and d(C+˜) = (q−1)(q−1−(a+b))
for the associated codes over Fq.
Let q = 16,a = 4 and b = 8. Then n = 225, |˜| = 45, d(C) = 165, d(C˜) = 105
and d(C+˜) = 45.
As d(C˜) = 105 > 60 = n − d(C), the procedure corrects t errors with t <
Min{d(C+˜), |˜|} = 45.
Remark 6.4 (Error correcting pairs). Pellikaan (1992) and Kötter (1992) intro-
duced the concept of error-correcting pairs for a linear code, see alsoMárquez-Corbella and Pellikaan
(2016). Specifically for a linear code C ⊆ Fnq a t-error correcting pair consists
of two linear codes A,B ⊆ Fnq , such that
(A⋆ B)⊥ C, dimFq A > t, d(B
⊥) > t, d(A) + d(C) > n. (6.5)
Here A ⋆ B = {a ⋆ b | a ∈ A,b ∈ B} and ⊥ denotes ortogonality with respect to
the usual inner product. They described the known decoding algorithms for
decoding t or fewer errors in this framwork.
Also the decoding in the present paper can be described in this framework,
taking C = C,A = C˜ and B = (C ⋆ A)
⊥ using Proposition 3.13.
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a+ b
a+ b
b
b
a
a
q − 2
q − 2
Figure 13: The convex polytope  with vertices (0,0), (a,0) and (0,a). The con-
vex polytope ˜with vertices (0,0), (b,0) and (0,b)). Their Minkowski sum +˜
having vertices (0,0), (a+ b,0) and (0,a+ b).
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